Adverse Events: The Need for the United States and Japan to Reform Patient Safety by Motto, Rocco Giovanni
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 3 
2016 
Adverse Events: The Need for the United States and Japan to 
Reform Patient Safety 
Rocco Giovanni Motto 
Washington University School of Law, St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rocco Giovanni Motto, Adverse Events: The Need for the United States and Japan to Reform Patient 
Safety, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 513 (2016), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
513 
ADVERSE EVENTS: THE NEED FOR THE 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN TO REFORM 
PATIENT SAFETY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When visiting a hospital or any medical facility, there is often a sense 
of nervousness and apprehension for both patients and accompanying 
family members.
1
 Even though patients may be nervous, they know that 
the medical staff will work in their best interest.
2
 But medical staffs are 
imperfect
3
: a nurse may err when administering an I.V. to a patient
4
 or a 
doctor may operate on the wrong side of a patient’s body.5 When errors by 
the medical staff occur, it is important for the staff to identify and correct 
these errors.
6
 
After the Institute of Medicine released a report in 1999, To Err Is 
Human, a startling discovery was apparent: between 44,000 and 98,000 
hospital patients in the United States died in 1997 as a result of an adverse 
 
 
 1. Katherine Mikk, Making the Plaintiff’s Bar Earn Its Keep: Rethinking the Hospital Incident 
Report, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 134 (2008–09).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. The hospital setting can expose patients to significant risks of illnesses relating to medical 
examination or treatment. Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, 
Disclosure, and Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 445 (2012). “One early study found that 
more than thirty-six percent of the patients admitted to a hospital developed iatrogenic injury.” Id. In 
addition, “nine percent had major complications, and two percent of all patients died for reasons 
related to the iatrogenic illness.” Id. Many critics have commented “that hospitals lack sufficient 
incentives to discover and reduce their adverse event rates” because they fear that disclosure will result 
in more malpractice claims. Id.  
 4. Related IV Infection, TANGENT MED., http://tangentmedical.com/related-iv-infection/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2014). Statistics on healthcare-associated infections (“HAIs”) show that HAIs are the 
most common problem associated with hospitalized patients. Id. HAIs cause one out of every twenty 
patients to acquire one or more infections and cause roughly 90,000 deaths a year. Id. After having a 
simple surgical procedure done, Bernard Reid died while he was resting. Natalie J. Kussart, Reporting 
Medical Errors: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385 (2007). While recovering 
after surgery, a nurse made an error in the ingredients of the fluid Bernard was supposed to be given 
and erroneously gave a muscle relaxant intravenously to Bernard. Id. In the following days, Bernard 
“went into respiratory arrest and died five days later.” Id.  
 5. Id. A child was diagnosed with a hernia on the right side of his body. Id. Since the documents 
in the hospital mistakenly indicated that the boy had a hernia on the left side of his body, the doctor 
performed surgery on the wrong side. Id.  
 6. Mikk, supra note 1, at 134. “Patients who suffer adverse events, even severe ones, often do 
not realize what has happened, are not told about the adverse event, and often do not file a claim for 
compensation for serious harms suffered.” Furrow, supra note 3, at 440. Adverse events are as old as 
medicine, and being that medicine has become more complex, the amount of adverse events has 
substantially increased. Id.  
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event.
7
 An adverse event is an unfavorable event that is caused by a 
medical product rather than the primary condition of the patient.
8
 In other 
words, an adverse event describes any harm to a patient as a result of 
medical care.
9
 A later study estimated that between 220,000 and 440,000 
hospital patients in the United States suffer from some type of adverse 
event that contributed to their deaths.
10
 Besides in the United States, the 
occurrences of adverse events are relatively high in every industrialized 
society throughout the world.
11
 Even though the occurrences of adverse 
 
 
 7. LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (2000), 
(discussing how adverse events are a leading cause of death and injury), available at 
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9728&page=26. When using the lower of the two estimates, 
the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) claims that more people die because of adverse events than motor 
vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS. Id. To reach this alarming number of patients affected by 
adverse events, the IOM conducted two studies, one in New York, and another in Colorado and Utah. 
Id. See also Furrow, supra note 3, at 439 (discussing the different forms of adverse events). As many 
as one-third of hospital patients are harmed. Id. These adverse events happen for many different 
reasons: staff errors, system failures of coordination and management, drug mismanagement, and 
many other reasons, which are discovered after the damage has been done. Id. 
 8. KOHN, supra note 7, at 28. Many adverse events are the result of errors. Id. at 29. In addition, 
adverse events that cause death to patients include: errors or delay in diagnosis, errors in the 
performance of an operation, inadequate monitoring and failure of communication among the medical 
staff. Id. at 36. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) defines an adverse event 
as “any injury caused by medical care,” which is almost the same definition provided by the Institute 
of Medicine. Furrow, supra note 3, at 443. With the complexity of medicine, adverse events are 
occurring more than ever before. Id. at 439. “Errors in drug prescribing continue to be a major source 
of patient harm, as are physicians who practice medicine contrary to clear practice guidelines.” Id. at 
440. 
 9. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-07-00470, ADVERSE 
EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES (Dec. 2008) (discussing the key issues regarding 
adverse events in hospitals), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00470.pdf. An 
adverse event represents that the medical outcome was not caused by the underlying disease. Id. at 2.  
 10. Marshall Allen, How Many Die From Medical Mistakes in U.S. Hospitals?, PROPUBLICA, 
www.propublica.org/article/how-many-die-from-medical-mistakes-in-us-hospitals (Sept. 19, 2013, 
10:03 AM) (discussing the study of John T. James and how James was able to come up with the new 
estimates). Because there has never been an actual account of how many patients actually experience 
an adverse event, these estimates are produced according to approximations. Id.  
 11. Robert B. Leflar, Discerning Why Patients Die: Legal and Political Controversies in Japan, 
the United States, and Taiwan, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 777, 778 (2014) (discussing the percentage 
of hospital patients that suffer from adverse events in Western nation; The United States, Japan, and 
Taiwan). Studies conducted in certain Japanese hospitals have concluded that six to eleven percent of 
patients suffered from an adverse event. Id. At turn of the 21st century, errors within the medical field 
began to attract public attention in Japan because of the highly publicized mistakes at well-known 
hospitals in Tokyo. Id. at 779; see also M. Bohensky et al., World Without Borders: Integrating 
Clinical Perspectives Into the Coronial Jurisdiction in Victoria, Australia, 25 MED. & L. 13, 14–15 
(2006) (discussing the various percentages of adverse events in certain countries). For instance, 
researchers in the United Kingdom found that 10.8 percent of the hospital patients reviewed in their 
study were correlated with a medical error. Id. at 14. Likewise, in New Zealand, adverse events are 
associated with 12.9 percent of hospital patients and contribute to roughly 1500 deaths per year. Id. at 
15. While in Canada, researchers have found that adverse events from system failures are associated 
with 7.5 percent of hospital patients. Id. Finally, researchers in Australia have estimated that 16.6 
percent of hospital patients deal with adverse events and 4.9 percent result in death. Id.  
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events are alarmingly high in every industrialized society, countries have 
treated the issue differently.
12
  
In analyzing adverse events, this Note explores the advancements and 
regulations regarding adverse events in the United States and Japan. In 
doing so, this Note places particular emphasis on the different reporting 
practices and mechanisms each country has implemented over the years 
while insisting that the United States government should federally 
mandate reporting systems. In addition, this Note will explore Japanese 
initiatives and practices that may help the United States substantially 
improve patient safety.  
First, this Note provides an overview of the history of adverse events 
within each country. When addressing the history, this Note will address 
when adverse events became a high priority within each country. This 
discussion will include statistics regarding adverse events before and after 
each country implemented some type of strategy to increase patient safety. 
Next, this Note is going to look at each country’s reporting regulations that 
have been implemented over time and the advantages and disadvantages 
for each reporting regulation. Furthermore, this Note addresses how the 
United States may, or may not, benefit from the provisions and practices 
that are implemented to help increase patient safety in Japan. Ultimately, 
this Note examines what efforts each country has taken to ensure that 
adverse events are reduced and patient safety within hospitals increases. 
Finally, after analyzing each country’s history of improving patient safety, 
this Note suggests that the United States should federally regulate adverse 
event reporting and determines whether or not the United States can utilize 
certain Japanese practices.  
II. HISTORY 
The report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, was the 
epiphany for many citizens and legislators in the United States that 
something had to be done to improve patient safety.
13
 In doing so, the 
 
 
 12. See Leflar, supra note 11, at 777.  
 13. Michael A. Morse, Mandatory Reporting of Adverse Events, Near Misses, and Mistakes for 
Acute Care Hospitals, 78 PA. B.A. Q. 124, 124 (2007) (discusses the famous report by the Institute of 
Medicine, the main changes that have been implemented by Congress throughout the years to help 
with patient safety). The report made it very clear that medical errors are a nationwide epidemic, 
which has a significant impact on hundreds of thousands of patients. Id. Further, not only did the 
report conclude that roughly 98,000 Americans died each year from medical errors, but approximately 
1 million dealt with substantial adverse events resulting in around $29 billion in annual financial costs. 
Id. The IOM report stressed that although some of these preventable adverse events may be the result 
of incompetence or impaired providers, the committee believes that many could have been avoided 
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Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommended a broad set of measures to 
address the problem of medical errors including a nationwide mandatory 
reporting system.
14
 Even though the 1999 IOM report strongly 
recommended a nationwide mandatory reporting system, no nationwide 
reporting system was administered; instead, federal and state statutes were 
implemented.
15
 Because many of the hospitals and healthcare providers 
were unaware of these federal and state statutes, there continued to be 
many medical errors that would go unreported.
16
 
As this Note discusses the history of reporting in the United States, it 
will become apparent that not enough is being done to increase patient 
safety. Similarly, Japan is another well-developed country that has 
struggled with increasing patient safety.
17
 Beginning in 1999, reports of 
errors at hospitals of high regard filled the news in Japan.
18
 These errors 
were a result of a nurse who accidentally injected a toxic agent into her 
patient and a team of doctors who were not sufficiently trained.
19
 More 
importantly, in each of these errors, physicians and hospital employees 
altered medical records, gave deceiving information to families and 
investigators, or engaged in other deceitful acts.
20
 Historically, institutions 
negligently monitored the quality of Japan’s medical care, but at the turn 
 
 
had an improved system of care been in place. The Journal’s Editorial Staff, A National Survey of 
Medical Error Reporting Laws, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 201, 203 (2008). The IOM 
encouraged Congress to make many steps in order to establish better patient safety. Id. First, the IOM 
encouraged Congress to establish a national system for health care quality measurement and reporting 
to collect reports from states concerning the most serious errors taking place in hospitals and other 
health care situations. Id. at 203–04. The IOM also recommended that the main causes of adverse 
events should be available to the public, therefore reinforcing facilities’ incentives to minimize errors 
and devote more to patient safety. Id. at 204.  
 14. Morse, supra note 13, at 124. According to the IOM the main goal of the reporting system 
was to adhere to specific reports of serious injury, hold organizations and providers accountable for 
patient safety, keep the public informed about unsafe conditions, and provide incentives to health care 
organizations to minimize the errors that cause these adverse events. Id. at 124–25. 
 15. Id. at 125. Many of the main targets of the federal and state statutes were completely unaware 
that mandatory reporting requirements existed. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error as Reportable Event, as Tort, as Crime: A 
Transpacific Comparison (Updated Version), No. 22 J. JAPAN L. 40, 41 (2006) (discussing that the 
issue of patient safety is unresolved in both countries), available at http://sydney.edu.au/ 
law/anjel/documents/ZJapanR/ZJapanR22/full%20article/ZJapanR22_07_Leflar_NEU[1].2.pdf.  
 18. Robert B. Leflar, The Law of Medical Misadventure in Japan, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79, 81 
(2011) (discussing the series of medical errors in Japan that led to a great deal of media coverage for 
the hospitals and medical staff). The series of events included a nurse who accidentally injected a toxic 
agent that killed her patient, a group of young doctors who failed to have an adequate supply of a 
patient’s blood type before engaging in a delicate surgery, and the death of a child at a major pediatric 
surgery center. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
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of the 21st century, administrative error and civil litigation forced 
Japanese medicine to improve patient safety.
21
 
Patient safety remains a constant problem within well-developed 
countries because the traditional approach to medical errors is 
insufficient.
22
 The traditional approach involves a focus on 
professionalism, individual honesty, and competence.
23
 The traditional 
approach to medical errors fails in two ways. First, the system is outdated 
because it targets individual accountability, and second, because it only 
targets individual accountability, it cannot assess today’s health system, 
which composes of an entire medical staff providing care for a single 
patient.
24
 Furthermore, the complexity of systems, not inept individuals, 
usually causes medical errors.
25
 Research has indicated that highly trained 
individuals who are trying to do the right thing cause the majority of 
harm.
26
 Thus, the strategy of punishing individual physicians who are 
dedicated to doing the right thing is ineffective.
27
 It is apparent that the 
traditional approach to patient safety is hopeless, and a new approach to 
patient safety must be implemented if well-developed countries want to 
see patient safety improve.
28
 
A. United States  
Throughout the years, several studies have been conducted on the 
nature of adverse events in hospitalized patients.
29
 One may think with so 
 
 
 21. Id. The Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare rarely inquired into failures of patient safety. Id. 
In addition, the medical education strongly discouraged any open questioning of practices taught by 
professors, even if those practices were not scientifically proven. Id.  
 22. Katharine A. Wallis, Developing a Culture of Safety: Regulation or Education? (May 2013) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Otago), available at http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/bitstream/ 
handle/10523/4195/WallisKatharineA2013PhD.pdf?sequence=1.  
 23. Id. at 10.  
 24. Id. In complex health systems, an individual who is working on a patient within a team may 
have little control over the prevention of error and injury; therefore, many of the factors attributing to 
medical error are outside the power of individual members of the staff. Id. at 10–11. Possible factors 
that contribute to team error include: equipment, poor organization and patient characteristics 
(stressed, poorly educated). Id. at 11.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. Most preventable harm is caused by flaws in the health system rather than the fault of the 
individual; therefore, the persistent pressure to incorporate more education and training is not likely to 
change the outcome of patient safety. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events In Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED. 377, 377 (1991), available at www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM19910207 
3240605. This study took place in 1984 in the state of New York, in which 3.7 percent of patients had 
injuries and that negligent care was responsible for twengty-eight percent of the injuries. Id. The study 
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many studies conducted and a country that is as technologically advanced 
as the United States, how can this country have so many adverse events.
30
 
Adverse events range from patient infection to unnecessary surgery.
31
 In 
order to increase patient safety, documentation and measurement of 
adverse events is a top priority.
32
 Thus, it is essential for hospitals to 
partake in reporting guidelines in order to provide an increase in patient 
safety.
33
 
Reporting is a principal element of patient safety because it can 
recognize medical errors, allow providers to learn from and decrease their 
mistakes, and monitor progress in the prevention of errors.
34
 After the 
 
 
looked at 30,195 records of patients who were hospitalized in New York in 1984. Id. at 378. Out of all 
the adverse events, forty-eight percent of them were caused from operations. Id. In addition, twenty-
eight percent of the adverse events were caused from negligent care. Id. Wound infections were the 
most reoccurring adverse event, which accounted for nearly one seventh of all medical errors 
identified in the study. Id. The next leading medical error was drug complications, which was the most 
common single type of adverse event. Id. The study also looked at where adverse events mainly 
occurred and found that the majority (forty-one percent) of adverse events resulted from treatment that 
was administered in the hospital room. Id. at 379. Overall, the report found that prevention of adverse 
events is dependent on medical knowledge; however, the high amount of adverse events that are due to 
management errors suggests that many adverse events were preventable during that time. Id. at 377; 
see also Ashley M. Votruba & Michael J. Saks, Medical Adverse Events and Malpractice Litigation In 
Arizona: By-The-Numbers, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1537, 1539 (2013) (discussing that at least 20,000 
adverse events occur in Arizona, and at least 1,300 result in deaths; also, the number of those adverse 
events that are considered to be a result of negligent care is estimated at 5,600). See also David 
Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows That Adverse Events In Hospitals May be Ten Times 
Greater Than Previously Measured, HEALTH AFFAIRS, content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/4/581.full 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014). 
 30. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward A Federal Model of Medical Error 
Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (discussing the magnitude of medical errors within the 
United States). While this country flourishes in technological advancements, there are too many 
patients that suffer avoidable injury and death from a spectrum of adverse events. Id. As early as 1858, 
an early biostatistician, by the name of Nightingale, developed the use of statistical methodology to 
show the effects of unsanitary conditions in military field hospitals, which laid the groundwork for 
standard statistical approaches for hospital data collection. Id. at 441–42. Later, in the 1920s, a Boston 
physician had become obsessed with collecting data on every patient in the hospital with the goal of 
learning what worked and how doctors contributed to bad patient outcomes. Id. at 442. By the 1960s, 
medical researchers began to focus on the problem of patients harms in hospitals. Id.  
 31. Furrow, supra note 30, at 3–4. Infections within hospitals has increased by approximately 
twenty percent from 2000 to 2003 and accounted for 9,552 deaths. Id. at 3. In addition, unnecessary 
surgeries have been estimated to be responsible for roughly 12,000 deaths per year. Id. at 4.  
 32. Classen, supra note 29, at 1. Multiple studies have emphasized that a lot of work is needed in 
order to improve patient safety. Id. In North Carolina, a recent study confirmed that a high rate of 
adverse events has not decreased over time. Id.  
 33. Id. “This focus on sentinel events has been encouraged by the adoption of reporting safety 
‘never events’ (events that should not have happened; for example, deaths from blood transfusions) in 
several states.” Id.  
 34. Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have 
Reporting Systems Made a Measureable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 330 (2005) (discussing 
the overall change after the implementation of the reporting system to patient safety five years after the 
IOM report came out).  
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IOM released its report, it recommended a comprehensive set of measures 
to tackle the nationwide problem of medical errors including a 
recommendation to have a nationwide mandatory reporting system.
35
 It 
sought, as its main goal, to ensure a response to specific reports of serious 
injuries, hold establishments and providers accountable for guaranteeing 
patient safety, implement incentives to health care establishments so that 
patient safety would increase, and respond to the public’s right to be 
informed about any unsafe conditions.
36
 In addition, the IOM insisted 
medical institutions comply with mandatory reporting in order for 
policymakers and health care administrators to grasp the root causes of 
medical errors and, later, implement systematic reforms.
37
 Since the IOM 
report, Congress and state legislatures have actively tried to deal with 
patient safety.
38
 Even though patient safety has received more attention 
after the IOM report, there is little improvement.
39
 For instance, after the 
IOM report, instead of a nationwide reporting system a patchwork of 
federal and state reporting regulations exist.
40
 
 
 
 35. Morse, supra note 13, at 124. See also Harrington supra note 34, at 330 (discussing that the 
IOM expected nothing less than a fifty percent reduction in errors over five years).  
 36. Morse, supra note 13, at 124–25.  
 37. The Journal’s Editorial Staff, supra note 13, at 203 (discussing the recommendations of the 
IOM report and the overall progress of medical errors since the IOM report). The IOM recommended 
that the analyses of the main causes of adverse events be available to the public, thus urging facilities 
to minimize errors and invest in patient safety. Id. at 204. Additionally, the IOM recommended that the 
Center for Patient Safety should implement voluntary reporting for minor medical errors. Id.  
 38. Harrington, supra note 34, at 331. In February 2000, President Bill Clinton mimicked the 
IOM’s plan by announcing a national action plan to reduce medical errors by fifty percent. Id. For the 
purposes of this Note, legislative activity among the states is far outside of this topic. For further 
information regarding states, compare Erik E. Sardiña, Search For Truth vs. The Public Good: The 
Effect of The Patient Safety Act on Common-Law Discovery Rules, 37 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 207 
(2012) (discussing the New Jersey Patient Safety Act) with Kussart, supra note 4 (discussing Illinois’ 
reporting laws).  
 39. Harrington, supra note 34, at. 331. See also The Journal’s Editorial Staff, supra note 13, at 
204–05 (discussing the progress since the IOM report). Since the IOM report, a number of state 
governments implemented medical error reporting systems. Id. at 204–05. For instance, at the time the 
report came out, there were thirteen states that collected medical error data. Id. Whereas by 2008, there 
were programs in twenty-seven states. Id. “In addition to gathering data on medical errors, state 
departments of health have worked with hospitals and other care facilities on root cause investigation, 
protocols to address known errors, and the implementation of best practices to prevent future errors.” 
Id. Besides the states, the federal government has also encouraged efforts to promote patient safety. Id. 
at 205.  
 40. Morse, supra note 13, at 125. Given that hospitals, healthcare providers, and attorneys have 
little or no understanding that mandatory reporting requirements exist, there continues to be a 
significant under reporting of medical errors. Id. See also Scott Jones, Reporting Adverse Medical 
Events: Quality Reporting Meets Compliance, 14 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 53, 55 (2012) 
(discussing the states that maintain a current listing of adverse event reporting requirements). In 
addition, not every state has implemented state laws and regulations addressing reporting of adverse 
events. Id. As of right now, there are only 29 states that have implemented plans with the National 
Academy for State Health Policy (“NASHP”). Id.  
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Following the consistent increase of medical errors in the United 
States, Congress passed the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act 
(“PSQIA”) in 2005.41 The PSQIA is the first federal legislative attempt to 
address patient safety and develop both a new national medical error 
reporting system and a federal opportunity for data collection.
42
 While the 
PSQIA incorporated the IOM’s recommendation to design a systematic 
review of error, the PSQIA only established a voluntary national reporting 
system.
43
 This system-based approach was set out to improve patient 
safety by incentivizing cooperation between health care providers and 
patient safety research entities.
44
 One of the most revolutionary additions 
to the PSQIA was that it created significant protections for errors that are 
disclosed for the purpose of patient safety research.
45
 Furthermore, under 
the PSQIA, information cannot be disclosed to a third party because the 
 
 
 41. Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 Preventing 
Error and Promoting Patient Safety, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 397, 397 (2010) (discussing the PSQIA and its 
potential effects on patient safety). Before the PSQIA was implemented, the United States relied on 
traditional mechanisms, such as medical malpractice and peer review. Id. at 400. The main issue with 
each of the reforms is the fact that they are punitive and they do not look into fixing medical errors in 
the future. Id.  
 42. Levy, supra note 41, at 397. Even though the PSQIA was passed in 2005, the Department of 
Health and Human Services did not issue the PSQIA until December 2008. Id. The patient safety 
movement in heath care is premised on reducing the level of adverse events. Furrow, supra note 3, at 
441. This PSQIA, attributed to several patient safety reforms and grants the right to the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services to expand patient safety initiatives. Id. “As part of 
comprehensive quality management programs, patient safety compliance programs are being 
developed by private firms as well as hospitals.” Id.  
 43. Levy, supra note 41, at 407. The final legislation was completely supported in the Senate. Id. 
Shortly before signing the PSQIA into law, President George W. Bush commented that the PSQIA was 
a “commonsense law” that would allow others to learn from the past experiences of doctors and nurses 
by protecting providers who report patient safety information. Id. See also Kussart, supra note 4, at 
390 (discussing the voluntary reporting system). Before the federal bill was passed, a bill similar to the 
PSQIA was introduced six-years prior but was never passed because of the main concerns for the 
protection of health care providers against liability. Id. Even though this prior bill failed, when the 
PSQIA was passed, Congress declared that this law will “be among the most significant healthcare 
legislation the Senate will consider during this Congress . . . because . . . this legislation will contribute 
immensely to the current efforts that are underway to save lives and reduce the tragedy of needless 
medical errors.” Id. (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S8741 (2005)). Even though the PSQIA does not 
express exactly what types of adverse events organizations are supposed to report, the PSQIA was a 
building point that allowed the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) to determine a 
common format for the reporting and consistent definitions. Id. All of the information that is collected 
will be used to analyze and evaluate national and regional statistics, which may ultimately lead to 
critical information to minimize medical errors. Id. at 390–91. The overall cost of the implementation 
of the PSQIA is estimated to be around $58 million over four years. Id. at 391. 
 44. Levy, supra note 41, at 407. The PSQIA encouraged providers to discuss patient safety 
experiences through a series of legal protections. Id. Providers who voluntarily reported safety 
information “may quality for both privilege and disclosure protections.” Id. 
 45. Id. Even though the protections are more comprehensive than any state-based protections, 
they are not absolute. Id. at 407. 
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information must be kept confidential.
46
 The main purpose of this 
protection is to encourage and ensure providers to report their errors 
without them having to worry that the reported errors will be used against 
them in any type of litigation.
47
 
Even though reporting systems have many advantages, they contain 
many problems such as a lack of consistency and developing more 
accurate and impactful information.
48
 In order to do so, the PSQIA needs 
to make sure that data collection is consistent and all regulations are 
current.
49
 When Congress enacted the PSQIA, the purpose was to provide 
steadiness within the system;
50
 however, “[c]ongress diverged from that 
purpose when they made the reporting system voluntary.”51 
However, the Food and Drug Act (FDA) has enforced regulations that 
provide a framework for the timing and content of adverse event reports.
52
 
Facilities, such as hospitals, surgical centers, and nursing homes are 
required to report any type of death or severe injury that was caused by a 
device within ten business days to the FDA and manufacturer.
53
 While this 
is a tremendous step in the right direction for patient safety, the 
implementation of a framework needs to cover more than just device-
related deaths if the United States wants to see a dramatic increase in 
patient safety.  
 
 
 46. Id. at 408.  
 47. Id. After the providers report the medical errors, the error information will be sent to Patient 
Safety Organizations (PSOs), where the information will be compiled and analyzed. Id. at 407–08. 
After analyzing the error information, PSOs are able to make recommendations for avoiding errors and 
improving overall patient safety. Id. at 408.  
 48. Kussart, supra note 4, at 395 (2007) (discussing the problems of the PSQIA).  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 396.  
 51. Id. There is no way for consistency to be achieved when states can decide whether or not 
they want to report. Id. The data received is not going to be much different from the data that is 
already in place because essentially nothing has changed. Id. Therefore, the trends and estimates will 
not be an accurate reflection of the nation because not all states or providers will be included. Id. In 
addition to the inconsistency, the PSQIA did not establish what type of events should be reported. Id. 
Instead, the PSQIA states that “‘the Secretary may determine common formats for the reporting . . . 
[and] common and consistent definitions.’” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 299b-23). 
 52. Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ensuring Medical Device Effectiveness and Safety: A Cross-
National Comparison of Approaches to Regulation, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 9 (2014) (discussing the 
adverse event reporting guidelines that have been implemented by the FDA).  
 53. Id. In 1993, the MedWatch program established a more streamlined adverse reporting 
mechanism for consumers, which collects voluntary submissions from health care providers and 
patients together with required reports from user facilities, importers, and manufactures. Id. These 
reports may be submitted in multiple ways, which makes it easier to volunteer the adverse event 
reports. Id.  
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B. Japan  
Around the same time To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System was presented in the United States, the Japanese public was 
dealing with a similar event.
54
 In 1999, medical error was brought to the 
public’s attention by the mass media when a lung patient at Yokohama 
City Medical University Hospital mistakenly had part of his heart valve 
removed and a heart patient had surgery on his lung.
55
 In the years 
following, numerous accounts of medical errors continued to be reported 
at well-known hospitals across Japan.
56
 In order to address and take 
control of this matter, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) 
set up a small patient safety office in 2000, which conducted a study that 
examined the occurrence of adverse events in Japanese hospitals.
57
 This 
study found that adverse events had occurred in 6–7% of hospitals, and 
that 23% of those adverse events were avoidable.
58
  
In distinguishing the limitations of the court system as a regulator for 
medical error, the MHLW launched several administrative proposals to 
address patient safety issues.
59
 One of the most notable proposals is the 
“Model Project for the Investigation and Analysis of Medical Practice-
 
 
 54. Robert B. Leflar, Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in Japan, 4 
DREXEL L. REV. 243, 245 (2011) (discussing the problem of medical error that first appeared within 
the Japanese public). Hereinafter Leflar, Public and Price Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in 
Japan. See also Robert B. Leflar, Unnatural Deaths, Criminal Sanctions, and Medical Quality 
Improvement in Japan, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POLY’Y & ETHICS 1, 6 (2009) (discussing the particular 
instance that resulted in two physicians getting arrested). “A twelve-year-old girl died during heart 
surgery at Tokyo Women’s Medical University Hospital in 2001 due to improper functioning of a 
heart-lung machine.” Id. During another medical error, the CEO of a well-known Tokyo hospital, 
along with two nurses, were arrested after the patient died from an accidental injection. Id.  
 55. Leflar, Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in Japan, supra note 54, at 
245.  
 56. Id. “The media played a important role in the public awakening: reporters competed to dig up 
the details of the tragedies . . . and embarrass the health ministry.” Id.  
 57. Leflar, Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care Harm in Japan, supra note 54, at 
246. The health ministry drafted guidance manuals advising hospitals to employ risk management 
personnel and started a voluntary adverse reaction reporting system Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 251. See also Leflar, supra note 11, at 793–94 (discussing Japan’s model project for the 
peer review). This project for peer review “[l]aunched in four urban prefectures and subsequently 
expanded to ten.” Id. at 793. This model project was an effort to improve the quality of hospital case 
reviews and regain the public trust in their objectivity, while channeling case reviews away from 
police. Id. The model project was impactful because it brought “independent specialists to investigate 
in-hospital deaths upon participating hospitals’ request, and to report results to the hospital, the family 
of the deceased, and . . . to the public.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/8
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ADVERSE EVENTS 523 
 
 
 
 
Associated Deaths.”60 This system allows hospitals to submit cases of 
questionable deaths to an independent review panel of outside experts.
61
 
After the experts review a case, they provide methods that will prevent 
similar events from happening in the future.
62
 Even though this is a step in 
the right direction, the number of participating hospitals and the number of 
cases submitted are substantially smaller than what was expected in the 
beginning.
63
 
Medical Authorized Holders (MAHs) are required to report adverse 
events directly to the MHLW.
64
 Even though most of the adverse event 
reports come from the MAHs, it is also possible for other stakeholders, 
such as facilities and providers, to submit reports either to MAHs or 
directly to the MHLW.
65
 “After receiving the adverse event reports, 
[Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA)] analysts 
evaluate the relationship between the device and the reported injuries or 
outcomes, trying to assess whether the outcome was related to user error, 
 
 
 60. Leflar, Public and Private Justice: Redressing Health Care harm in Japan, supra note 54, at 
252. At the suggestion of four major medical societies, in 2005, the ministry set up the Model Project 
for the Investigation and Analysis of Medical-Practice-Associated Deaths [(“Model Project”)]. Id.  
 61. Id. The review panel of outside experts would conduct an autopsy, “review the medical 
records, interview the participants in the patient’s care, and compile a report for both the family and 
the hospital.” Id. The experts would then evaluate everything that happened and explain what 
measures should be taken to prevent similar events in the future. Id. The review process involves 
medical specialists, attorneys, nurses, and health officials. Id.  
 62. Id. While the Model Project is a great step in the right direction for patient safety, it is 
important to know that there are limitations: it only addresses death cases, not cases dealing with 
serious injuries. Id. In addition, these case reports have been known to take longer than expected, 
which slows the process and angers the families who are anxious to hear the cause of death. Id.  
 63. Id. See also Japan Establishes Programs to Address Medical Errors, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
www.who.int/patientsafety/news/japan_programs/en/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (discussing the 
programs that the Japanese health officials administered to address medical errors). The health 
ministry created a trial malpractice database, which provides information on unexpected hospital 
deaths and serious after effects of treatments. Id. These prominent health officials are expecting that 
this information will be provided to roughly 250 national and university hospitals in Japan, with the 
overall goal to help better educate nurses and doctors on how to prevent accident and near-accident 
patterns. Id. Furthermore, health officials are dedicated to addressing errors made by pharmacists, 
since it is a significant contributor to medical errors. Id. The Japan Pharmacist Association is planning 
to certify pharmacists who develop expertise with the nearly 300 kinds of anticancer medicines that are 
available in Japan. Id. In order to receive certification, pharmacists have to demonstrate that they are 
fully aware of the medical properties that deal with all relevant drugs. Id.  
 64. Kramer et al., supra note 52, at 11–12 (discussing adverse event reporting within Japan). The 
MAHs must report the adverse events to the MHLW within 15 or 30 days; this is all dependent on how 
serious the problem is. Id. at 11.  
 65. Id. Other parties involved in the manufacturing and supply of devices, such as distributors, 
also must report to the MAHs adverse events or events that otherwise factor into overall safety and 
effectiveness judgments. Id. “Health care providers are required by law to cooperate with MAHs 
during active investigation of safety problems.” Id. Most importantly, when providers “learn of cases 
of diseases, disabilities or deaths suspected to be caused by the use of medical devices, and they 
confirm that it is necessary to prevent the spread of hazards, they must report to the MHLW.” Id.  
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the underlying disease, or a device malfunction.”66 When it comes to 
device malfunction, MAHs track and report events that occur outside 
Japan for similar or related devices—not just devices specifically sold in 
Japan.
67
 
Unlike United States hospitals, Japanese hospitals are not required to 
perform self-critical analyses; however, many Japanese hospitals are 
beginning to complete self-critical analyses using the references from the 
National University Hospital Presidents’ Conference and with guidance 
from the MHLW.
68
 With the continuation of medical errors, the MHLW 
adopted a broader principle, which made it a mandatory requirement to 
report accidents.
69
 Although this was an improvement from the past, 
MHLW’s original reporting program was unsuccessful.70 
In 2003, MHLW changed its direction and determined that accidents 
causing harm to patients, in addition to near-miss events, would be the 
concentration of the redesigned reporting system.
71
 Similar to the United 
States, and since 2004, the reporting of accidents causing harm has 
become mandatory (only under the FDA), rather than voluntary.
72
 Instead 
 
 
 66. Id. This assessment can lead to two different routes: it may conclude that further 
investigation is required by the MAHs or that the evaluated data is going to need additional safety 
measures, such as a change in labeling. Id.  
 67. Id. Collecting foreign data is particularly important for Japanese regulators because most 
medical devices used in Japan are sold in other countries prior to being used in Japan. Id. If there were 
to be a recall or if a safety alert was issued in another country, the MAHs must notify PMDA and 
analyze whether there is a possible impact on domestic devices or patients. Id. For instance, “[i]f a 
recall . . . is determined to relate to a manufacturing problem limited to devices sold outside of Japan, 
the MAHs still must submit the root cause analysis and evaluation, and determine whether systems in 
place are sufficient to prevent a similar problem from arising domestically.” Id. at 11–12  
 68. Leflar, supra note 17, at 56. Part of the caution is attributable to the concern by Japanese 
medical leaders, which is also a concern to the leaders of the United States, regarding the possibility 
that this information could be used to the detriment of medical defendants’ civil malpractice actions. 
Id. There are four sources of legal obligation which raise some concern to the Japanese hospitals and 
physicians: “(1) national and local Freedom of Information rules that apply to public hospitals; (2) the 
liberalized discovery rules under Article 220 of the civil procedure law; (3) an asserted contractual 
obligation . . . to investigate hospital accidents and report the results to patients; and (4) the 
requirement for reporting to the police of ‘unnatural deaths’ in Article 21 of the Physicians’ Law.” Id.  
 69. Id. at 58. This reporting requirement was brought into effect with the help of the court’s 
decision. Id. Facing a similar controversy as the United States, Japan faced a major issue in structuring 
its patient safety programs. Id. Initially, MHLW set standards to establish safety management systems 
including systems for internal reporting to hospital patient safety committees of accidents involving 
injury. Id.  
 70. Id. at 59. The “near miss” reports, which officials hoped would contain great amounts of 
information to help identify specific problems, were unhelpful and left the officials figuring out the 
root causes of these accidents. Id. A small amount of the staffers were available to read and analyze 
the reports to give feedback. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. This included an additional 272 larger and specialized facilities, including all national and 
university hospitals. Id.  
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of the reports being made to a governmental entity with enforcement 
powers, the reports are now sent to an independent quasi-public entity, 
which has the sole purpose of collecting and analyzing medical accident 
data and determining the remedial measure.
73
 
1. The Use of Medical Prosecutions and the Media in Japan 
Unlike the United States, during the initial recognition of medical 
errors, Japanese hospitals and physicians worry about the probability of a 
police investigation and criminal prosecution.
74
 In addition, the Japanese 
engage in several legal strategies that are not present in the American legal 
system.
75
 For example, “professional negligence causing death or injury” 
is a common charge brought against medical personnel—a type of crime 
not found in the United States.
76
 Furthermore, the prosecutorial culture in 
Japan is much more different than that found in the United States.
77
 After 
the Supreme Court of Japan’s landmark conviction of the Hiro General 
Hospital director in Tokyo, many physicians and hospitals have chosen to 
file “unnatural death” reports whenever a patient dies in circumstances 
where possible professional negligence was involved.
78
  
Even though there is a constant worry about criminal prosecution, the 
more significant impact on medical errors is the amount of media coverage 
 
 
 73. Id. This type of reporting structure is similar to the air safety reporting system in the United 
States. Id. See also Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/asrs/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (discussing that the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was implemented to improve aviation safety by providing a 
venue where pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, ground personnel, and others 
involved in aviation operations can share information about unsafe situations that they have 
encountered or observed). Id. Additionally, these reports are held in strict confidence. Id. When a 
report is made to ASRS, all information about the submitter is not taken away before the report is 
posted. Id.  
 74. Leflar, supra note 17, at 65. Even before the media provided mass coverage of the medical 
errors taking place within hospitals, an average of two to three prosecutions per year were brought in 
medical cases in Japan—a frequency much higher than is reported in the United States. Id. at 65–66. In 
the past few years, medical prosecutions have continued to increase in Japan. Id. at 66.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 66. The few convictions in the United States consistently involve charges of 
recklessness or intent, which requires a higher level of mens rea. Id. at 67. 
 77. Id. at 72. The Japanese prosecutorial culture focuses on determining the exact facts of each 
case, and when prosecutors consider possible charges, they consider whether the victim has received 
compensation or an apology. Id. In contrast, American prosecutors neither need nor consider the 
doctor’s remorse or whether or not there was an apology, which is imperative in the Japanese 
prosecutorial culture. Id.  
 78. Id. at 68–69. Because of this particular case, the number of reports to police has increased 
eight-fold since 1998, the year before the case became public. Id. at 69. 
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that these medical errors receive.
79
 The media coverage has portrayed 
hospitals and physicians negatively, which creates the need for patient 
safety, induces patients to seek criminal prosecution, and encourages 
police investigations.
80
 
III. ANALYSIS 
To say that Japan’s model for increasing patient safety will eliminate 
the occurrence of medical errors in hospitals across the United States 
would be inappropriate. Given that humans are imperfect, there will 
always be medical errors present within the medical field.
81
 However, it is 
appropriate to expect well-developed countries to significantly increase 
patient safety over time by implementing and understanding different 
methods and solutions. After much consideration, it is clear that applying 
Japan’s model to the United States is not realistic. Nevertheless, the 
United States may benefit and increase their patient safety by adopting 
certain characteristics found in Japan’s system.82 
A. Why Mandatory Reporting Will Improve Patient Safety 
As discussed in Section II, after enacting the PSQIA in 2005, the 
United States encouraged facilities to voluntarily report medical errors.
83
 
The current approaches to tracking adverse events can be very 
intimidating; however, these approaches include voluntary, sentinel event 
and never event reporting systems, which are often mandated by state 
regulators.
84
 These voluntary methods of gathering adverse events fail 
because they do not detect the majority of adverse events and, therefore, 
 
 
 79. Id. at 66. Because of the amount of publicity that hospitals and physicians were receiving 
during that time, the medical profession was on edge and had helped create a public expectation that 
the police and prosecutors will play a significant role in medical errors. Id.  
 80. Id. The relentless media coverage depicts hospitals and physicians in a negative way, by 
showing the people the harm and the amount of lying within hospitals. Id.  
 81. See Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care; Addressing Federal-
State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation To Promote Patient Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
219, 223 (2003) (discussing the complexity of systems used within hospitals). Some of the 
characteristics that make these systems complex include: technical needs, long hours, long operations, 
and trade-offs between employees. Id. at 224–25.  
 82. E.g., Leflar, supra note 17, at 66.  
 83. See Levy, supra note 41, at 407. 
 84. Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, Disclosure, and 
Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 452 (2012) (discussing the issues with collecting adverse 
events data).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/8
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ADVERSE EVENTS 527 
 
 
 
 
we do not have enough information to properly attack this problem.
85
 In 
addition, underreporting is a significant issue when there is not a 
mandatory system to report adverse events because without data there is 
no way to know what to change about the current method.
86
 If the federal 
government made the disclosure information about adverse events a 
requirement, competition could be created among hospitals to decrease 
patient safety risk, ultimately leading to higher patient safety standards.
87
 
Even though the federal government has moved in the right direction by 
requiring hospitals to publicly report deaths and certain bad outcomes, the 
United States should define bad outcomes more broadly in order to trigger 
more disclosure requirements.
88
 
Allowing individual states to adopt their own rules on disclosure is a 
step in the wrong direction because only a little more than half of the 
states adopted rules requiring hospitals to disclose certain medical errors.
89
 
Without consistency among the data collected, the chances of increasing 
patient safety are very slim.
90
 Consistency cannot be achieved when states 
have the power to decide whether or not they want to report certain 
medical errors.
91
 Therefore, the trends and estimates that are provided by 
the states will in no way be an accurate representation of the nation 
 
 
 85. Id. at 452–60. Studies gathering the actual incidence of negligent events in hospitals found 
that many adverse events were not reported in hospital records as required, which occurred more often 
when the main person responsible for the error was a senior physician. Id. at 460. In order to stop 
hospitals from concealing adverse events, strong sanctions should be enacted and a new government 
agency or department should be appointed to focus solely on adverse event detection, measurement 
and reduction. Id.  
 86. The Journal’s Editorial Staff, supra note 13, at 213.  
 87. Stephen D. Sugarman, Outcome-Based Regulatory Strategies for Promoting Greater Patient 
Safety, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 573, 583 (2014) (discussing numerous strategies to increase 
patient safety within the United States). Determined to improve the frequency and quality of patient-
provided information regarding adverse events, federal officials have recently considered asking for 
patients who think they have suffered from some type of medical error to report their experience to the 
government. Id. at 588. 
 88. See id. Hospitals must include death rates from heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia, as 
well as readmission rates. Id. at 583. 
 89. Id. at 586. Certain state websites are more helpful than others in terms of overall information 
and user friendliness. Id. While information provided by other states can be quite useless and a waste 
of time. Id. A problem is that patients may want to know how well a hospital has eliminated 
preventable adverse events, “but also how well it does in achieving the positive goals the proposed 
patient treatment aspires to.” Id. at 587.  
 90. Kussart, supra note 4, at 395. Additionally, the purpose behind the PSQIA was to provide 
consistency within the system. Id. at 396.  
 91. Id. Data received from voluntary reporters will not be of much use, especially because there 
is a chance that the report is incomplete. Id.  
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because not all states will be included.
92
 Even though a mandatory system 
may improve patient safety, there is no guarantee that medical personnel 
will follow the law.
93
 Finally, by making a national reporting system 
mandatory, more states and providers will participate, which will 
ultimately lead to more accurate statistics.
94
 
B. What Can the United States Implement from Japan? 
Because of a strong history of stringent criminal prosecutions in Japan, 
Japan has substantial benefits regarding patient safety compared to the 
United States.
95
 Without question, these two countries have differences 
within their legal structures, which has forced each country to take 
different approaches to improving patient safety.
96
 The criminal 
prosecution system in Japan has helped motivate the medical profession to 
commence internal system improvements.
97
  
In the past two decades, there has been an estimated twenty-five to 
thirty-five cases of criminal prosecution for medical negligence in the 
United States.
98
 Multiple factors have contributed to this low amount of 
prosecutions.
99
 Additionally, even though there is a high frequency of civil 
medical malpractice actions in the United States, the threat of criminal 
prosecutions does not give much concern to American physicians or 
hospitals.
100
 
 
 
 92. Id. See also Bryan A. Liang, Collaborating on Patient Safety: Legal Concerns and Policy 
Requirements, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 83 (2005) (discussing the importance of how collective learning 
would increase and promote patient safety across the United States). 
 93. Kussart, supra note 4, at 396. For example, even though speed limit signs are posted on 
roads, they are not going to ensure that everyone obeys that law. 
 94. Id. In any event, accurate statistics will lead to a greater chance of an increase in patient 
safety. Id. Since the PSQIA did not establish the type of events that must be reported, the PSQIA data 
collected is going to be a surplus of irrelevant information. Id. In order to achieve consistency, all 
health care providers must know precisely what to report. Id. at 397.  
 95. Leflar, supra note 17, at 75.  
 96. Id. at 74.  
 97. Id. at 75. In response to the criticisms of the extent of the criminal justice system’s 
involvement in the patient safety arena, the MHLW launched a “model project” in 2005. Id. at 73.  
 98. Id. at 64. Based on these cases, convictions were obtained on the basis of the defendants’ 
reckless disregard for a patient’s safety. Id. The reason for such a low amount of prosecutions is the 
fact that these matters are so complex, with such a high burden of proof that makes it impractical for 
anyone to pursue a case. Id. at 64–65. Additionally, the need for medical experts and the length of time 
required for a case makes the prosecution of medical personnel a costly and difficult task. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. Injured patients and their families rarely seek to have the negligent physicians prosecuted. 
Id.  
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In comparison, a major worry of Japanese hospitals and physicians is 
the possibility of police investigation and criminal prosecution.
101
 
Additionally, the Japanese prosecutorial system in Japan allows for a 
larger number of causes of action than that found in the United States.
102
 
Because there may be an issue of liability considerations, there is a 
demand for suspicious medical errors to be communicated to some neutral 
entity outside of the hospital.
103
 Accustomed to Japan, the police and the 
media have become popular external entities who can effectively respond 
to adverse events.
104
 In other words, Japanese individuals who are affected 
by a medical error are more inclined to call for police and seek 
prosecutorial involvement than Americans.
105
 
While it would not be ideal or beneficial for the United States to adopt 
a system that would create fear in its doctors,
106
 it may be beneficial for 
the media to get involved with reporting medical errors. After considering 
the differences between Japan and the United States, it is apparent that if 
the media in the United States would be as fierce as the Japanese media 
after medical errors, then legislators, hospitals, and physicians may be 
more inclined to increase the safety within facilities.
107
 If the United States 
media portrayed medical error issues as international issues, much more 
would be done.
108
 
Throughout this Note, it has been mentioned that communication 
among medical staff is a vital component to patient safety. Therefore, it is 
fundamental for there to be constant communication between nurses and 
 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 66.  
 103. Id. at 68.  
 104. Id. Even though the police are not medical experts, it is understood that some might favor a 
system that encourages reporting to the police as a public accountability mechanism. Id.  
 105. Id. at 71. One of the main reasons the Japanese are inclined to seek the police is that they 
look to public authorities to resolve disputes that Americans would resolve privately. Id. Additionally, 
patients who suffer from a medical error go to the police because of the practical difficulties and 
delays in obtaining civil law remedies through malpractice actions. Id.  
 106. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality In the U.S.: Is 
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem Or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 896 
(2005) (discussing how liability will hinder the overall quality of healthcare). When doctors are 
punished for their decisions, it may discourage them from reporting errors. Id.  
 107. Leflar, supra note 17, at 45. See also Rachael Lee Burgess, The Effect of Media Bias on 
Legislation: A Case Study of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 on Immigration (June 30, 2011) (unpublished 
thesis, Rowan University) (discussing when Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act in April 2010.) Following the enactment, media from all over the country 
gave their opinions on whether or not the immigration bill should be implemented. Id. at 1. 
 108. Leflar, supra note 17, at 48. Once the public is informed on the issue, more will be done to 
help resolve it. Id.  
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doctors, and for facilities to figure out how to improve communication.
109
 
Within the United States, there is a nurse shortage, and it is expected to 
continue throughout the next eight to ten years.
110
 Similarly, Japan has a 
deficiency in nurses too,
111
 however, because of particular studies 
conducted in Japan, facilities are able to adjust to the main causes that 
attribute to medical errors.
112
 Additionally, in Japan, the amount of small 
to medium-sized hospitals plays a crucial role because the workplace is 
less strenuous on the entire medical staff.
113
  
The United States may want to consider the development of smaller 
hospitals and an overall increase in medical staff.
114
 If the United States 
does not increase nurses within hospitals, it will increase the stress level of 
current nurses, encourage nurses to leave the profession, which would 
eventually lead to an increase of medical errors.
115
 
C. What Can Be Done to Further Improve Patient Safety Within the 
United States? 
It is impossible for an institution to improve patient safety without first 
knowing its deficiencies; therefore, the primary goal is to learn about the 
institution.
116
 After learning about the causes within the hospital, it is 
important to address the mistakes by providing leadership with the tools to 
fix the mistakes.
117
 Safety improvements can only be implemented within 
 
 
 109. Linda L. Lindeke & Ann M. Sieckert, Nurse-Physician Workplace Collaboration, ONLINE J. 
ISSUES NURSING, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarket 
place/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume102005/No1Jan05/tpc26_416011.html.  
 110. Robert J. Rosseter, Nursing Shortage Fact Sheet, AM. ASSOC. COLLEGES NURSING, Apr. 24, 
2014, http://www.aacn.nche.edu/media-relations/NrsgShortageFS.pdf. The lack of nurses is not 
because of the lack of interest in the field but because of constraints such as the lack of classroom and 
budget constraints. Id. at 2. Furthermore, according to AACN’s report in 2012–2013 U.S. nursing 
schools turned away over 79,000 qualified applicants from nursing programs. Id.  
 111. Nursing in Japan, JAPANESE NURSING ASSOC., http://www.nurse.or.jp/jna/english/nursing/ 
employment.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 112. See generally, e.g., Yasushi Kudo et al., Safety Climate and Motivation Toward Patient 
Safety Among Japanese Nurses in Hospital of Fewer than 250 Beds, 47 INDUS. HEALTH 70, Oct. 14, 
2008, available at https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/indhealth/47/1/47_1_70/_pdf. This study showed 
that reporting, nursing conditions, and communications with physicians had significant impacts on 
preventing mistakes. Id. at 74. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See id. 
 115. Rosseter, supra note 110, at 3. More than seventy-five percent of resident nurses believe the 
nursing shortage presents a significant problem for the quality of patient care. Id.  
 116. Furrow, supra note 3, at 458. Overtime, hospitals have been described as “obtuse” 
institutions—they fail to learn from experience and data due to their culture and structural features 
embedded within history. Id. at 458–59. In order for hospitals to discover errors and their causes, 
money, time, and participation is going to be needed. Id. at 459.  
 117. Id. at 459. 
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a facility that is adequately staffed and funded.
118
 Money must be spent on 
electronic medical records and staff that can identify adverse events within 
these medical records.
119
 
When it comes to monitoring adverse drug events, infections and other 
kinds of harm, there needs to be a boost in computerized detection tools.
120
 
One approach is to detect adverse event patters by using the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvements’ Global Trigger Tool, in conjunction with the 
use of data mining software.
121
 
Mandating public adverse event disclosure would allow for an increase 
in patient safety because important information will be provided to address 
adverse event needs.
122
 While many critics argue that mandatory reporting 
would suffocate errors and deter critics from reporting, evidence for this 
assumption is not strong, and there is evidence that supports the 
contrary.
123
 In addition, “[p]hysicians who are not exposed to liability are 
no more likely to report errors than physicians who are exposed to 
liability.”124 Over time, adverse events have been viewed as a waste 
product of hospitals, a product that is both harmful and inefficient.
125
 The 
consistent waste of adverse events demands regulation towards an increase 
to patient safety.
126
   
 
 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. A health care system should use a multitude of tools, including tools that are not human. 
Id. In other words, hospitals need a boost in various computerized detection systems to identify 
adverse events. See id.  
 121. Id. at 460. These tools are programmed to detect outlier problems in care that may otherwise 
be unnoticeable to medical staff and administrators; however, these programs are unlikely to pick up 
the range of adverse events that nurses, doctors, and other providers would detect during patient care. 
Id.  
 122. Id. at 461.  
 123. Id. Evidence has been provided that insists that full disclosure in a properly designed system 
reduces litigation risk, settlement and payout costs. Id. “Tom Baker and Timothy Lytton observe that 
the claim that medical malpractice liability discourages error reporting has never been documented by 
empirical research, and a recent, careful review has thoroughly discredited this conventional wisdom.” 
Id. (quoting Tom Baker & Timothy Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical 
Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233, 244–45 (2010)). 
 124. Id. at 462. “Reporting hospitals’ comparative outcomes would be valuable. Public reporting 
my stimulate quality-improvement activity by hospitals, although a strong correlation between public-
reporting obligations and clear evidence of safety improvement is not yet established.” Id. This 
collected data is more than likely to improve over time because of the constant pressure from private 
and government payers. Id.  
 125. Id. at 463. “Ernest Codman first used the term waste to describe patient harms. He argued 
that hospitals must track their practices and evaluate outcome of their patients, since he felt that patient 
harm due to infections and unnecessary or inappropriate operations was a hospital waste product.’” Id.  
 126. Id. at 464.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
While it is apparent that both the United States and Japan have long 
realized that medical errors are a significant problem within their nations, 
neither country has figured out a way to minimize these errors and 
increase patient safety. Overtime, both nations have developed new 
regulations to improve patient safety, but none of these improvements 
have left a significant impact. It is clear to see that the numbers support the 
fact that patient safety has not improved. In order for either nation to 
increase patient safety, the collection of data is a necessity. With more data 
collected and analyzed, the more likely each nation will have a better 
understanding on how these medical errors occur within medical facilities. 
Finally, in order for this data to be gathered, the United States must 
federally mandate medical error reporting in order to properly attack this 
demoralizing issue.  
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